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Abstract. Launching on STS-108 Endeavour in late 2001, the Small Payload Access to Space
Experiment (SPASE) demonstrates a number of new technologies, efficient ways to conduct a
nanospacecraft development program, and how to take such a spacecraft through the Shuttle
Hitchhiker safety and integration process. This paper describes the essential “lessons learned” in
each of these areas. Commercial solar panels, batteries, imagers, photocells, integrated circuits,
and manufacturing techniques are used throughout the vehicle, bringing the low cost and high
manufacturing reliability of these products into the space realm. Core personnel carried the
program from conception through proposal, requirements definition, design, development,
integration, test, and delivery, making the whole program significantly more efficient. Shuttle
safety issues were addressed from the beginning and continually throughout the program, as part
of (not added to) the development effort. The information learned throughout this process, and
the new doors opened by this demonstration – such as the first use of Lithium-Ion batteries in a
Shuttle payload – help make space utilization more efficient, more affordable, and easier for
future missions. AeroAstro’s Bitsy nanospacecraft kernel will be flight-proven by the SPASE
mission.
Introduction
The SPASE program began in Spring 1998
with a partnership between AeroAstro and
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
Science Directorate (SD). MSFC SD wanted
an inexpensive way to perform free-flying
microgravity crystal growth experiments;
AeroAstro wanted to demonstrate its Bitsy
nanospacecraft kernel.
The SPASE mission was proposed in
September 1998 to the X-34 Future-X
program as a way to reduce the cost of access
to space, by developing and demonstrating a
vehicle that could perform a useful science /
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technology mission for under $2M including
launch.
The program was awarded in
December of that same year.
Contract
negotiations began in mid to late 1999, and the
contract was signed in January 2000.
Technical development of AeroAstro’s
portion of the satellite (Bitsy – providing
power management, voltage regulation,
commanding and telemetry, data storage,
batteries, and radios) and SD’s portion (the
Microgravity Crystal Growth Demonstration,
or MCGD, containing the crystal growth cell,
illumination,
camera,
and
interface
electronics) began at that point, along with
development of the shared components (solar
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panels, specified by AeroAstro but mounted to
MCGD, and passive magnetic attitude control
system, with parts mounted in both units).
Flight unit integration lasted from late Winter
through late Spring of 2001, and at time of
this paper’s writing, the spacecraft is in
environmental test, performing well after mass
properties, vibration, and all five cycles of
thermal/vacuum testing. Integration with the
Shuttle Hitchhiker is expected on July 30,
2001. This timeline itself demonstrates one
important lesson: proposal and contracting
took approximately the same amount of time
(~18 months) as the technical program.
While the core SPASE team was small, the
personnel and organizations involved were
ultimately extensive.
The primary
contributors to the program included:
•

MSFC Space Transportation Directorate,
providing
funding
and
program
management for all aspects of the program
except the MCGD

•

MSFC Science Directorate, providing the
MCGD payload and science analysis

•

MSFC Engineering Directorate, providing
test facilities and support personnel

•

AeroAstro, the prime contractor for the
spacecraft, providing the Bitsy spacecraft
kernel and ultimately responsible for the
mission

•

University of Alabama at Huntsville,
providing the ground station facility and
spacecraft operators

•

Payload Systems Incorporated, providing
Shuttle safety support, and authoring the
majority of the Shuttle safety package

•

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC), providing the Hitchhiker ride into
space and extensive safety support

•

NASA Johnson Space Flight Center (JSC),
providing final Shuttle safety review and
particular assistance in battery issues

•

Team Encounter, providing funding for a
CMOS imager experiment to assist in the
development of a new star tracker

•

Kyocera Solar Corporation, providing the
solar panels and the process for creating
them that has the advantages of
commercial
manufacture
with
the
resilience required for space

The spacecraft itself is 56.6 cm tall, 43.2 cm
in diameter, fitting comfortably inside a
Hitchhiker can. It will be ejected by a Pallet
Ejection System (PES) from a cross-bay
bridge on STS-108, scheduled for launch on
November 29, 2001 for a Space Station
servicing mission. SPASE will be deployed
near the end of the Shuttle mission into a
Station altitude and inclination orbit.

Figure 1. SPASE Demonstration Vehicle.
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The photograph in Figure 1 shows the SPASE
Demonstration Vehicle flight hardware during
mass properties testing.
The Shuttle
Hitchhiker Palette Ejection System interface is
visible at one end of the spacecraft, as are two
of the six commercial terrestrial solar panels.
Visible in the following picture (Figure 2) are
the internal Bitsy electronics. The radio stack,
an S-band transmitter/receiver using FM
uplink and BPSK downlink, is in the left
corner. The Lithium-Ion battery pack is in the
bottom corner, with charging and managing
electronics visible on top of the battery

Figure 3. NASA Marshall MCGD.

thermally isolated as much as possible to
maintain a suitable sample temperature.
This paper will explore “lessons learned” in
three realms:

Figure 2. Bitsy Internal Electronics.

enclosure.
The large electronics board
spanning the width of the Bitsy box is the
Bitsy-SX* Power/Command/Telemetry board.
The NASA Marshall Microgravity Crystal
Growth Demonstration canister is shown in
Figure 3. A commercial camera is mounted
inside of a hexagonal support structure, and is
focused on a sugar water solution in which a
crystal will grow on orbit. The experiment is
*

The Bitsy product line has three versions: 1) SX, the
core electronics providing power, commanding, and
telemetry functions; 2) DX, the SX with an automotiveelectronics computer; and 3) LX, a product in
conceptual design that will incorporate recent advances
in miniaturized technology such as micro momentum
wheels.
Scott McDermott

3

•

The Recurrent Lessons, items which
remain true for all programs but are
reviewed to highlight their importance

•

Technology Lessons, specific things
learned about the various technologies
being demonstrated on this vehicle

•

Shuttle Lessons, focusing on the effort of
Shuttle safety approval.
Recurrent Lessons

Integrate Early
Any two pieces of equipment, however well
designed and however well-defined the
interface, will have at least one anomaly when
they are integrated for the first time. Often
and hopefully these issues are small and easily
resolved, but they will occur, and sometimes
they will be significant and require nontrivial
modification to one or both items. This
applies to both electrical and mechanical
interfaces. Therefore, integrate early to learn
sooner rather than later what needs to be fixed.
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To integrate early, something in subsystem
development has to be shortened (assuming
the product delivery time is fixed).
A
shortening of the design effort is good if it
encourages simplification in the design, but
bad if it induces a rush to production. A
shortening of the subsystem test effort is good
if it focuses those tests on subsystem
behaviors that cannot be tested once
integrated, but bad if it produces subsystems
that “mostly work” and have to be extensively
modified later.
Simplicity Breeds Robustness
A single straightforward, easily tested system
is worth four cross-redundant complex ones.
It may not be glamorous or exciting to build
simple systems, but simple systems work, and
in the space industry the device must work.
On the SPASE battery system, we inherited a
design which used a microcontroller to
program the charger. There is a version of the
charger IC which does not require a
microcontroller, but the battery pack vendor
chose features over simplicity, and used the
microcontroller. We have had no end of
problems with this design.
Conversely, the communications system is a
bytewise UART-based protocol, with no
phase-locked-loop clock recovery in the
receiver, no packetization of the downlink
data, and a single 5-byte command structure
that controls all spacecraft functions. This
reduces our bandwidth efficiency, increases
our bit error rate, and forces the ground station
software to piece together the bits of an
interrupted downlink, but it works, and works
well. In space, “optimal” should have a very
clear meaning: one optimizes for robustness,
and let “performance” (a term which certainly
only has meaning when the device works) fall
where it may.
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Schedule Conservatively
It is alright to be pleasantly surprised when
things go well and faster than anticipated. It is
not alright to have things go poorly and then
run out of time to correct them. There are
clear warning signs that a program is walking
down the wrong path.
The first warning sign is a knowledge at the
beginning of the program that getting to the
end in time is going to be difficult – at the
beginning, one should think that there is just a
little too much time. The perception of “just a
little too much time” at the beginning
generally corresponds to an accurate
prediction of the actual time something will
take.
Another warning sign is the
presumption that something (usually a test) is
going to go well. This has two problems: one,
it encourages too little time to be scheduled
for the test; and two, it discourages a sense of
urgency to perform that test, and delays it.
On SPASE we were concerned that the digital
electronics and the power system would be
difficult to integrate. We were pleasantly
surprised at how easy it was. We were
however not concerned about the system’s
performance at temperature, since we were
expecting a quite benign temperature regime
of –7 to +35oC. As a result we did not take
early opportunities to temperature-cycle the
electronics, and when we did get to it, had a
number of issues to address, and no time to do
so.
The total number of issues we
encountered in the digital/power integration
far exceeded the four problems we had at
temperature; but the latter problems had far
greater impact because we did not schedule
time to deal with them.
A final note on scheduling is the fairly
obvious, but still critically important,
statement: do not add new hardware near the
end of the program. As with the timing
perception above, the sense that “We could
15th Annual/USU Conference on Small Satellites

have done more” generally reflects that the
program has done exactly the right amount.
Resist the urge to trade current schedule
advantage for a new and untested feature.
Test to Break Things, Not Show They Work
This is an overstatement but a valuable one.
Thorough testing – by which is meant many
hours of using a system in the manner in
which it will be used operationally – is critical
for a device that is going to spend its
operational life far out of reach of repairing
hands. “Thorough”, however, is a nebulous
word easily twisted to mean “I tried each thing
once and it worked”. The testing attitude is
critically important, and for design testing –
not workmanship – the attitude should be
“What can I do to make this device
misbehave?” Each power line may have
worked when it was turned on. But what if
they were all turned on at once? The current
limit may work, turning a line off when it
pulls too many amps. But what if the device
pulled the maximum number of amps,
continuously, not crossing the limit? Can the
system sustain that? Are the analog telemetry
signals affected? How about the combination:
all the power lines turning on at once, all of
them pulling the maximum amount of power.
Will the system support that? It may be
alright if it does not. But the very act of trying
it will teach you more about your system,
lessons you want to learn on the ground.
There is another approach to testing which
says to characterize every parameter of a
system, quantitatively.
This is certainly
informative but it does not encourage the
useful attitude above. It often inspires a false
confidence because the parameters you check
are already the ones you designed for; the
“What can I do to break it?” attitude
encourages thinking about aspects of the
system not directly related to specific
performance parameters.
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Have a Small, Highly Communicative Team
with a Leader
It is a highly desired but never attained goal to
have all interfaces, and performance
characteristics, and system architectures
defined completely at the beginning of a
program, then letting the designers go off and
build their well-specified systems. The fact of
any development is that there are new things
learned on a daily basis which affect, change,
or obviate yesterday’s specification. This is
not to be avoided; it is to be understood and
incorporated into the development flow. Any
changes should be communicated with the
team, not formally (which can discourage
communication), but by simply contacting the
people involved and discussing the change
with them. In order to make sure that a
change made in one realm does not conflict
with a change made in another, the team
should have a leader who is always kept
informed of these developments. This only
works if the team is small and interactive
enough
to
allow
such
spontaneous
communication without grinding the program
to a halt or overwhelming the leader with
information.
Technology Lessons
Commercial Solar Panels Are Good
Space solar panels have three issues which
distinguish them from terrestrial solar panels:
one, they see severe thermal shock at orbit
dawn / orbit dusk, stressing solder connections
and material bonding; two, they encounter
more ultraviolet and ionic radiation; and three,
they must survive launch stresses*. As a
result, space solar panels are traditionally
handmade, with careful attention paid to
*

There is an issue of performance – cells optimized for
higher wavelengths, and the increasing use of
multijunction cells in spacecraft – but that is a
distinction in degree rather than in kind; terrestrial
panel manufacturers care about performance too.
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interconnect strain relief, and with individual
glass panes placed over each cell because
glass is resilient to ultraviolet radiation and
helps block ions. The result is a laborintensive, costly process that cannot take
advantage of automated manufacturing
techniques or quantity testing.
Kyocera
Solar
Corporation
expressed
confidence that they could manufacture panels
using a variant of their usual process that
would satisfy the three requirements for space
use, while still taking advantage of the highly
refined and reliable automated manufacturing
process they use for manufacturing
commercial units. They worked extensively
with AeroAstro to develop a series of
prototype panels, and with the cooperation of
NASA Marshall under a Space Act
Agreement, the panels were tested and the
process refined to produce exactly what
Kyocera promised. Panels built under this
refined process are now set to fly on SPASE,
and should answer the one remaining
question, of performance in a LEO radiation
environment.
The lessons learned here are both
programmatic
and
technical.
Programmatically, having a vendor like
Kyocera who is interested and excited about
the project makes enormous difference both in
the ease of the interaction and in the quality of
the product delivered. Vendors whom we had
to convince to work with us turned out
immeasurably worse. Technically, the panels
are superlatively easy to work with, being
covered in Tefzel® (a durable and protective
Teflon laminate) instead of glass, and show a
very respectable 12-14% efficiency. This is
one of the most exciting technologies being
demonstrated on SPASE.
Lithium-Ion Batteries Are Good
This is the other singular technology that is
most notable on SPASE. To explore the
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lessons learned, a distinction must first be
made: the battery cells, manufactured by
vendors such as Maxell or SAFT or Sony or a
host of others, are robust, reliable, safe, and
inspire great confidence.
The battery
electronics, designed in-house or delivered by
a vendor, can be finicky and must handle the
high power flowing through them in any
configuration. The electronics must be able to
switch directly from high-current charge to
high-current discharge and back.
More
strongly, the electronics must be more than
able to handle such extreme conditions: they
must be overdesigned, able to handle
conditions far more extreme than the ones
actually expected.
Lithium-Ion battery circuits, to assuage safety
concerns (which are actually now handled
within the cell anyway), traditionally
incorporate a pack manager in addition to a
charger. This manager disables charge, or
discharge, or both, if it detects a problematic
situation in the battery cells: overvoltage,
undervoltage, overcurrent, overtemperature,
undertemperature, or cell mismatch. The
difficulty is that if it misinterprets any of these
conditions as existing when it does not, it can
become caught in an unrecoverable mode,
with the battery turned off and no way to get it
back. AeroAstro’s observation is that a cell
management circuit does not add to the safety
features already present in modern LithiumIon cells, and decreases overall pack
reliability.
To reiterate the earlier statement, the LithiumIon cells themselves are excellent, their
manufacturing process refined through
billions of cellular telephones and laptop
computers and camcorders and the like. The
future use of Lithium-Ion in spacecraft, with
energy densities well over 100 Watt-hours per
kilogram, is a given, and SPASE is a
pathfinder for this development in the
industry.
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CMOS Imagers Are Promising and Worth
More Effort

Industrial Electronics Are Good
The aerospace industry lives with the legacy
of a time when integrated circuits were in their
infancy and careful parts testing and selection,
including, usually, custom part development,
was essential. This has long since become
untrue but the legacy lives on. Modern
industrial-grade electronics are practically
indestructible, and the fact of mass production
means that their quality far exceeds any
custom-built device.
In an effort to
understand why parts remains such a concern
in space industry circles, AeroAstro began
investigating reports of part failures, and
found without exception that each case
investigated was one where the part was
misapplied or the systemic behavior
misunderstood; that is to say, the fault was
with the circuit design, not the circuit
components. In fact, during Bitsy prototyping,
electronic components were often subjected to
conditions far outside their stated tolerances,
as is usual during debugging; yet almost every
time, even these abused parts kept working.
The issue of radiation is often presented as a
reason why terrestrial electronics are
inappropriate for space. This conception
continues despite the many spacecraft using
industrial electronics, even in high-radiation
orbits, without problem. Certainly there are
missions and situations which call for
radiation-hardened or radiation-tolerant parts,
but the majority of modern missions – in LowEarth Orbit for 3 years or less – do not. It is
worth noting that humans are less tolerant to
radiation than any semiconductor by
approximately one order of magnitude, and
they have been living in LEO for quite some
time.
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Team Encounter funded the addition of a
CMOS camera to the SPASE vehicle as part
of a star tracker development for their
extrasolar Encounter spacecraft.
The
advantages of CMOS imagers over others
(particularly CCDs) are that CMOS has
significantly lower power requirements –
lower voltage, more tolerance to noise, lower
total power consumption – and an easier
interface, and especially useful for star
trackers, they can perform massively parallel
two-dimensional computations on the imager
plane: particularly, the imager itself can
identify all star loci in a single step. The
tradeoff is that CMOS is significantly less
light-sensitive than CCD technology. The
advantages of CMOS warrants continued
development into a useful star tracker, and the
CMOS camera flying on SPASE will
characterize the current state of technology in
this application.
Passive ACS Systems Are Easy to Design, but
Just as Difficult to Test as Active Ones
SPASE uses four hysteresis rods and one
permanent magnet to reduce rotational
accelerations and help the side-mounted solar
panels point generally at the Sun. The
hysteresis rods are soft-magnetic material
which resist a change of orientation within a
magnetic field, and require no power. The
permanent magnet is mounted at the top end
of the spacecraft inside MCGD, and the
hysteresis rods are at the bottom end on each
of Bitsy’s four walls, to prevent the former
from magnetizing the latter. The design is
simple, efficient, and performs the required
function of keeping the crystal growth
chamber (mounted near the center of gravity
of the vehicle) in a microgravity acceleration
environment.
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The difficulty lay in the characterization of the
magnet and the rods to ensure they would
perform the required job. The forces involved
are so miniscule that they are easily
overwhelmed by gravity or the mechanical
and material characteristics of the test
apparatus. The forces (as predicted) are more
than adequate in space, where the
contravening forces – gravity gradient, solar
pressure – are similarly small. But they are
“lost in the noise” on the ground, at least for a
reasonable budget. SPASE relies on the
simplicity-into-robustness argument in the
extreme for the ACS system, as it is simple in
the extreme. However, thorough and realistic
ACS testing remains, for this simple system as
well as for complex ones, one of the most
significant
difficulties
of
spacecraft
manufacture.
Miniaturization Can Make for a Spacecraft
That Is Both Very Easy and Very Hard to
Assemble
For SPASE, the single Bitsy box housed the
subsystems that required six boxes on
AeroAstro’s previous spacecraft: power
management, batteries, command and data
handling, telemetry and control, radios, and
payload interface. And AeroAstro’s previous
spacecraft themselves had fewer boxes than
was typical. This miniaturization pays off not
only in having fewer units to assemble, but in
the fact that the result system is quite small
and easily managed by a single person. Thus
disassembly of the spacecraft to get at a
subsystem took a single person a fraction of
an hour, instead of a team of people most of a
day.
The negative consequence of this is that all of
the radio, and power, and payload, and
telemetry cabling, that used to be spread out
across a vehicle the size of an oil drum, is now
tucked into a space the size of a pie box. This
makes both mounting and routing a difficult
process that generally requires either small
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fingers or a clever tool. This lesson will
certainly be applied in AeroAstro’s future
Bitsy-based spacecraft.
Shuttle Lessons
Communicate Extensively with Shuttle
Safety People
A design decision explained early will have a
smoother ride through the safety process than
the same decision explained at the formal
safety package presentation.
Conversely,
when choosing between two otherwise equal
design options, discussing it with the relevant
Hitchhiker or Shuttle safety person can
eliminate a great amount of difficulty.
Selecting separation switches, setting the radio
transmission power level, placing electrolyteabsorbent material around the battery cells,
and any number of other issues were rendered
easily solved at the design stage instead of
having to be addressed post-manufacture
because the matter was raised with the
Hitchhiker safety team. There is also the
significant – arguably more significant –
factor that by communicating frequently with
the NASA safety team, a sense of mutual trust
and understanding is fostered, making the
formal
document
approval
more
straightforward because the reviewers are
already familiar with both the design and the
designers.
It Is Vital to Know the Opinions of the
Particular Safety People Involved
The Shuttle safety process is certainly replete
with specification documents, and clarification
documents, and inter-center agreements to
recognize each other’s documents.
The
commonly held belief is that these documents
fully specify the requirements that must be
met by a Shuttle payload. The fact, however,
is that there is a great amount left open to
interpretation, and it is of course only the
interpretation of the people approving your
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safety plan that matters. For instance, there is
a limit, expressed in Volts per meter, defining
how strong a radio transmitter can be before it
is considered a hazard. What is not expressed
is where this limit applies. At the outer
envelope of the payload? At the nearest
device that can be affected by the
transmission? At some nominal distance, such
as one meter? Each of these possibilities were
presented by various Shuttle safety personnel
at various times. As above, the important
thing is to communicate the system design to
the safety team, and solicit the opinion and
advice of the individual responsible for
approving this aspect of your safety plan.
Simple Does Not Equal Easy
No matter how simple the design, no matter
how straightforward the approach, you will
still need to explain it to the safety team just
as thoroughly, and justify it just as solidly, as
if it were thoroughly intricate and complex.
Certainly a simple design is easier to explain
than a complex one; but the scrutiny will be
the same on both. Once again, the key is
communication with the safety team.
Involve Someone who Already Knows Their
Way around the System
AeroAstro hired Payload Systems Inc., who
has assisted with the integration of a number
of Shuttle payloads – assisting particularly in
the safety process – to help take the SPASE
design and convert it into a safety package
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that would look familiar, understandable, and
complete to the safety review team. PSI knew
or got to know many of the personalities
involved with the Shuttle safety process, both
the Goddard Hitchhiker team and the Johnson
Shuttle team. This was very valuable both in
knowing whom to ask when a particular
question arose, and in determining the best
way of expressing the safety aspects of the
SPASE mission in a way acceptable to both
the Goddard team and the Johnson team. It is
important to remember, however, that by
involving another organization in this process,
that organization must be kept informed of
new developments in the spacecraft design,
both in order to incorporate this information
into the safety package, and to highlight any
safety implications of the new design.
Conclusion
The SPASE mission demonstrates a number
of exciting new technologies to reduce the
cost of access to space. In conducting this
program,
many
technological
and
programmatic lessons were learned, which can
benefit other missions of its type, and will
benefit AeroAstro’s Bitsy nanospacecraft
kernel and Bitsy-based spacecraft. Since the
idea of Bitsy is to create a kernel of spacecraft
functions that can be used across a broad
variety of missions, the benefit of the SPASE
program is not only in the increased
experience of the team involved, but in the
reproducible Bitsy product itself.
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